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Article 
Reformulating the Miranda Warnings  
in Light of Contemporary Law and 
Understandings 
Mark A. Godsey† 
Since Miranda v. Arizona1 was decided in 1966, scholars 
have devoted much attention to both the theoretical underpin-
nings and the real world impact of that decision. Commentators 
have debated, among other things, whether the warnings un-
duly hamper the ability of the police to obtain confessions,2 
whether the Court correctly construed the Fifth Amendment’s 
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schools. Finally, I would like to thank UC law student Michelle Berry for her 
outstanding research assistance, and the Harold C. Schott Foundation for pro-
viding a grant to further this scholarly endeavor. Copyright © 2006 by Mark 
A. Godsey. 
 1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reas-
sessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387 (1996) [hereinafter Cassell, Miranda’s Social 
Costs] (arguing that the Miranda warnings impose high social costs in the 
form of many lost confessions); Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from 
False Confessions and Lost Confessions—And From Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998) (arguing that the Miranda warnings prevent police 
from obtaining confessions, which harms the innocent by permitting criminals 
to remain on the streets); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996) (arguing that Miranda’s costs in terms 
of lost confessions are small); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Ef-
fect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. 
REV. 500 (1996) (same). 
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Self-Incrimination Clause3 in crafting the warnings,4 whether 
the warnings requirement itself constitutes a legitimate exer-
cise of the Court’s authority,5 and whether the warnings are 
constitutional in nature.6 
Little attention, however, has been paid to the substance or 
content of the warnings. As anyone who watches television 
crime dramas knows, a suspect subjected to custodial interro-
gation must first be advised that she has a right to remain si-
lent, that anything she says may be used against her in court, 
that she has a right to an attorney during questioning, and that 
if she cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for her.7 
The Supreme Court has often stated that the Miranda warn-
ings requirement is a prophylactic rule that can change and 
evolve.8 However, in spite of forty years of legal developments  
 
 
3. The Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause provides: “No per-
son . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
4. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 435 (1987) (arguing that the Miranda Court correctly construed the Self-
Incrimination Clause); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties: 
A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174, 174–81 (1988) (argu-
ing to the contrary). 
5. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 453–55 (arguing that the Court 
properly exercised its authority in crafting the Miranda warnings); Grano, su-
pra note 4 (arguing to the contrary). 
 6. See, e.g., Debate, Paul Cassell v. Robert Litt, Will Miranda Survive?: 
Dickerson v. United States: The Right to Remain Silent, the Supreme Court, 
and Congress, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1165 (2000) (Professor Paul Cassell debat-
ing Mr. Robert Litt over the issue at the Georgetown University Law Center 
on Mar. 28, 2000); see also Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The 
International Arena: A Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a 
Proposal for a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1735–52 
(discussing the status of Miranda warnings as a constitutional prophylactic 
rule and providing numerous citations to law review articles debating this is-
sue). 
 7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469–73 (1966) (describing the warn-
ings required prior to “in-custody interrogation”). 
 8. In Dickerson v. United States, for example, the Court cited several 
cases establishing that Miranda is a flexible, prophylactic rule and stated: 
These decisions illustrate the principle—not that Miranda is not a 
constitutional rule—but that no constitutional rule is immutable. No 
court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various cir-
cumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of 
modifications represented by these cases are as much a normal part 
of constitutional law as the original decision. 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000) (citing New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). 
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and practical experience, the content of these famous four 
warnings has never been modified or even been subjected to 
systematic scrutiny. 
This Article proposes that the substance of the Miranda 
warnings should be reconsidered as the rules of law underlying 
the warnings substantially evolve, and as we gain new insights 
into their effectiveness (or lack thereof ). In light of the signifi-
cant legal changes of the last four decades, and the real world 
experience gained with the warnings during this time, 
Miranda’s fortieth anniversary presents an opportune time to 
reexamine the content of the warnings. This examination 
should ensure that the warnings remain consistent with and 
continue to reflect the evolving legal principles that support 
and justify their existence, and to reaffirm that they remain ef-
fective in upholding and enforcing the constitutional rights of 
suspects. 
A close examination of the warnings suggests that they are 
out of date. If the warnings were redesigned today by a Court 
as mindful of properly balancing the competing interests as 
was the Miranda Court, they would probably take a different 
form.9 In contemplating this new form, my purpose in this Arti-
cle is not to delve into every conceivable modification to the 
warnings that one might consider. Rather, my goal is to intro-
duce the concept of updating the warnings using a few exam-
ples, with the hope that I will generate discussion on this im-
portant issue. I attempt to do this by suggesting and discussing 
a few potential changes to the warnings that appear to me to be 
among the most pressing.10 
First, I propose that the first two warnings, relating to the 
right to silence, should be buttressed by a new “right to silence” 
warning that provides something to the effect of: “If you choose 
to remain silent, your silence will not be used against you as 
 
 9. In some ways, the task this Article undertakes might be seen as an 
academic exercise. Indeed, I am asking in part what the Miranda Court would 
have done had it known what we know today. As one commentator stated 
when I presented this paper at a workshop, “The Miranda Court disliked con-
fessions . . . . The current Court likes them.” This is another way of saying that 
the current Court would likely have no interest in improving the warnings or 
bringing them up-to-date. Nevertheless, the Court’s views may change in time, 
and the suggestions in this Article could be adopted by state legislatures. 
 10. While the Supreme Court could, of course, modify the Miranda warn-
ings, the most likely venue for policy changes of the magnitude suggested in 
this Article might be state legislatures. The Court would then be faced with 
the question of whether the legislated changes are constitutional. 
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evidence to suggest that you committed a crime simply because 
you refused to speak.” 
Next, the third and fourth warnings, relating to the right 
to counsel, should be removed and replaced with three new re-
quirements, reflecting legal developments and practical lessons 
that have come to light since 1966. The first requirement would 
be a new warning as follows: “If you choose to talk, you may 
change your mind and remain silent at any time, even if you 
have already spoken.” The second requirement would be a rule 
mandating that the police reinstruct suspects of the new 
Miranda warnings at intervals throughout lengthy interroga-
tions. Finally, the police would be required to videotape inter-
rogations. These three new requirements would more effec-
tively achieve the intended policy goals of the right to counsel 
warnings and, thus, should be considered as replacements to 
the right to counsel warnings in the prophylactic scheme. 
This Article first examines, in Part I, a few specific post-
Miranda changes and developments in law, understandings, 
and practical knowledge. Part II then asks whether modifica-
tions to the warnings to reflect such new developments make 
sense in light of the various justifications and theories of 
Miranda put forth by scholars and courts. 
Specifically, Part I begins the journey into the suggested 
modifications by exploring the changes that have occurred in 
Miranda’s surroundings since 1966. Part I.A explains how the 
theoretical underpinnings of the Miranda warnings have 
evolved since that time. Miranda has morphed from an inflexi-
ble constitutional command to a flexible prophylactic rule that 
can be modified in the manner suggested in this Article. With 
this fact in mind, Part I.B focuses on post-Miranda develop-
ments regarding the right of a suspect to bar the prosecution 
from using her decision to remain silent against her as evi-
dence of guilt at trial. This substantive right did not clearly ex-
ist at the time that Miranda was decided. Although it was for-
mally recognized as a substantive right in 1976, it was not at 
that time added to the litany of rights police are required to re-
cite under Miranda. In addition, this Part develops the hy-
pothesis that one of the leading reasons why Miranda has not 
had its anticipated effect—why most suspects feel compulsion 
and waive their Miranda rights—is because suspects are not 
informed of this right. In other words, suspects may waive their 
rights simply because they erroneously conclude that remain- 
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ing silent “looks bad” and will ultimately hurt their chances in 
court, basing their decision on a set of warnings that has not 
yet caught up with the law. This pressure, or fear of a severe 
penalty, may constitute compulsion in violation of the Self-
Incrimination Clause. 
Part I.C examines post-Miranda developments regarding 
the right to counsel during interrogations. The right to counsel 
warnings were designed for several reasons, the primary of 
which was to ensure that suspects have a “continuous opportu-
nity to exercise”11 their right to remain silent. This Part focuses 
on the demonstrably ineffective nature of the right to counsel 
warnings in practical application, and posits that these warn-
ings have not had their intended effect. This Part also explores 
the erosion of the substantive, legal right to counsel during in-
terrogations that has occurred since Miranda was decided. 
Part II then addresses the impact these specific modern 
developments should have on the warnings themselves in light 
of various modern justifications of Miranda set forth by courts 
and scholars. It asks whether these suggested modifications to 
the warnings can be supported and would be made under sev-
eral of these distinct, competing justifications for the warnings. 
Part II.A analyzes whether changes to the warnings should be 
made, in light of the modern developments set forth in Part I, 
under the Miranda decision’s original “compulsion” theory. 
Part II.B analyzes the appropriateness of the proposed modifi-
cations under the due process “voluntariness” theory of 
Miranda jurisprudence, which currently has many adherents. 
Part II.C analyzes whether changes to the warnings should be 
made under the due process notice theory proffered by leading 
Miranda scholar George C. Thomas III. Finally, Part II.D ana-
lyzes the proposed modifications under the “objective penalties” 
theory of Miranda. 
I.  MODERN DEVELOPMENTS: 1966–2006 
A. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE WARNINGS 
At the outset, it is important to briefly explore how the 
Court’s doctrinal justification for the warnings has evolved over 
time. This effort is necessary to support the notion that chang-
ing or modifying the warnings, which this Article will discuss 
 
 11. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
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in its remainder, is an exercise that does not run afoul of the 
Court’s teachings. 
1. The Miranda Court: 1966 
It is likely that in 1966, the Miranda Court would have 
looked askance at the suggestion of modifying the warnings 
decades later. The Court stated that the warnings were not in-
tended to be a “constitutional straightjacket.”12 Congress and 
the states were free to experiment with alternative methods of 
“apprising accused persons of their right of silence” and assur-
ing that such individuals have “a continuous opportunity to ex-
ercise it.”13 The Court suggested, however, that any “potential 
alternatives for protecting the privilege”14 had to be at least as 
effective in conveying the substantive content of the four warn-
ings as the procedure set forth by the Court.15 In other words, 
while the Court appeared open to modifying the mechanism by 
which suspects could be informed of their rights, a fair reading 
of Miranda suggests that the Court was not open to changing 
the content of the information that must be conveyed.16 
Because it is difficult to imagine a politically palatable 
method by which suspects could be advised of their rights other 
than the suggested procedure of having police officers recite the 
warnings,17 it is arguable that the Court was merely paying 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. (stating that alternative procedures had to be “at least as effective 
in apprising accused persons” of their rights as the method set forth in the 
Miranda decision). 
 16. In Duckworth v. Eagan, the Court approved a set of warnings where 
the officer in question had slightly altered them from the standard Miranda 
warnings, holding that the warnings need not be given in the “exact form” pro-
vided by the Miranda decision. 492 U.S. 195, 202–05 (1989). The Duckworth 
Court reminded, however, that whatever form of warnings an officer devises 
must “touch[] all of the bases” of Miranda to pass constitutional muster. See 
id. at 203. Thus, in 1989, the Court appeared to disfavor the idea of dramati-
cally changing the content of the warnings in the manner suggested in this 
Article, although the question of overhauling the warnings in light of modern 
developments was not directly before the Court at that time. 
 17. Perhaps the Miranda Court had in mind a rule that counsel must be 
provided to each suspect prior to interrogation. This would allow the substance 
of the warnings to be conveyed by the suspect’s own attorney, and would sat-
isfy the concerns surrounding the inherent compulsion of custodial interroga-
tion expressed by the Miranda Court. As the Court was unwilling to go this 
far itself in the Miranda decision, it likely viewed this as an alternative that 
Congress and the states were unlikely to adopt. Time has proven this hy-
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diplomatic lip service to the idea that Congress and the states 
were free to experiment with alternative procedures. In reality, 
the four warnings did act as a straightjacket,18 and the Court’s 
unequivocal and strong language throughout the rest of its 
opinion hammered home the point that the basic content of all 
four warnings must be conveyed to suspects prior to custodial 
interrogation.19 
The notion that the Miranda Court would not have been 
amenable to the idea of future modifications in the substance of 
the warnings is fortified not only by the Court’s strong lan-
guage, but by the theory that it employed to justify the warn-
ings themselves. Indeed, the Court required the warnings as a 
direct result of its interpretation of the word “compelled” in the 
text of the Self-Incrimination Clause.20 The Court held that the 
atmospheric pressure or coercion inherent in custodial interro-
gation equates with compulsion and, thus, runs afoul of the 
 
pothesis to be correct, as no jurisdiction has adopted this alternative method of 
apprising suspects of their rights. The Court might also have envisioned a sys-
tem whereby suspects were to be brought before a neutral magistrate prior to 
custodial interrogation, with the magistrate then apprising them of their 
rights. As this procedure is even more suspect-friendly than the rule devised 
in Miranda, it too was likely not seen as a politically feasible alternative, and 
it has not been subsequently adopted except in limited situations in the con-
text of advising juveniles of their Miranda rights. See Jennifer J. Walters, 
Comment, Illinois’ Weakened Attempt to Prevent False Confessions by Juve-
niles: The Requirement of Counsel for the Interrogations of Some Juveniles, 33 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 487, 504 n.149 (2002) (discussing magistrate warning rule 
for juveniles in Texas). 
 18. Notably, jurisdictions in the United States did not widely experiment 
with alternative methods of advising suspects of their rights after the 
Miranda decision. This is likely because the police-based procedure the 
Miranda Court set forth was the most politically palatable method imagin-
able. In 1968, Congress attempted to create a new procedure by enacting 18 
U.S.C. § 3501, which made the recitation of warnings merely one factor in de-
termining the voluntariness of a confession. See Godsey, supra note 6, at 
1742–43. Because this statute was generally seen as unconstitutional, as it 
deviated from Miranda’s dictates, it was largely ignored by federal prosecutors 
until it was held unconstitutional by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 
441 (2000). See Godsey, supra note 6, at 1742–52. 
 19. For example, the Miranda Court stated that the substance of the 
warnings “must” be provided and is an “absolute prerequisite to interroga-
tion,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471–72, and a prerequisite to the admissibility of 
any resulting confession, id. at 476. 
 20. See id. at 461–62; see also Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involun-
tary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-
Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465, 499–505 (2005) (discussing the Miranda 
Court’s recognition of the Self-Incrimination Clause’s ban on compelled state-
ments as the proper test for confession admissibility). 
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Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause.21 Rather than 
ban custodial interrogation outright, however, the Court held 
that interrogations could ensue in such circumstances if the 
pressure was first dispelled by the recitation or waiver of warn-
ings.22 
In delineating the four required warnings, the Court 
viewed each as having its own unique and important role in 
dispelling the pressure. The Court required the first warning, 
“You have a right to remain silent,” for several related reasons: 
to inform the suspect of this “fundamental” right, to assure the 
suspect that she will not be penalized for refusing to talk, and 
to let even the most educated suspect know that the police are 
playing by the rules and that she has the power to stop the in-
terrogation if she chooses.23 The Court required the second 
warning, “Anything you say may be used against you in a court 
of law,” to make the suspect aware of the consequences of 
speaking, and to ensure that the suspect understands that she 
has entered an adversarial phase of the criminal justice system 
and that the police may not have her best interests in mind.24 
The Court deemed the third warning, “You have a right to 
an attorney during the interrogation,” necessary for three rea-
sons. First and foremost, it was seen as a fortification of the 
first warning.25 Because the Court viewed custodial interroga-
tion as a practice that can quickly “overbear the will of one 
merely made aware of”26 her right to silence, a suspect with 
counsel present in the interrogation room would have an ally to 
constantly remind her of her rights and look out for her inter-
ests.27 The presence of counsel would ensure that compulsion 
did not seep back into the interrogation room. Other benefits of 
the right to counsel warning include the fact that the police 
would be unlikely to engage in third-degree interrogation tac-
tics with counsel present, that counsel could be a witness to 
such police conduct if it occurred, and that counsel could ensure 
that the accused gives an accurate statement that is correctly 
recorded by the police.28 The final warning, “If you cannot af-
 
 21. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461, 469. 
 22. Id. at 467–77; see also Godsey, supra note 20, at 499–505. 
 23. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468–69. 
 24. Id. at 469. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 469–70. 
 28. Id. at 470. 
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ford an attorney one will be appointed for you,” was designed to 
make clear that the right to counsel is available to all, so that 
an indigent suspect does not feel compulsion because she 
wrongly assumes that this right applies only to those who have 
sufficient means to procure a lawyer.29 
Thus, the Court viewed each warning as directly tied to, 
and stemming from, the Self-Incrimination Clause. Each warn-
ing played a role by itself and in combination with the others in 
dispelling the inherent pressure and removing the “compulsion” 
from the interrogation setting, and in ensuring that the inter-
rogation room remains compulsion-free for the duration of the 
interview. Accordingly, removing one of the warnings would be 
tantamount to removing a brick from a dam, as it would cause 
the protective barrier to crumble and render the warnings inef-
fective. 
2. Post-Miranda: 1966–2006 
Shortly after Miranda was decided, however, the Court re-
treated from its “compulsion” theory as originally delineated in 
Miranda. In a line of cases that includes Harris v. New York,30 
New York v. Quarles,31 Michigan v. Tucker,32 Dickerson v. 
United States,33 and United States v. Patane,34 among others, 
the Court made two important changes to confession jurispru-
dence. First, the Court retracted its compulsion analysis of the 
Miranda decision, and reasserted the pre-Miranda voluntari-
ness test as the primary standard for determining the admissi-
bility of confessions.35 Second, the Court recast the Miranda 
warnings requirement as a flexible, prophylactic rule, which is 
designed as a first-step litmus test to determine whether or not 
a confession was made voluntarily.36 
 
 29. Id. at 473. 
 30. 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971) (holding that a statement taken from a 
defendant during custodial interrogation where no Miranda warnings had 
been administered may be used for impeachment purposes at trial). 
 31. 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984) (creating a “public safety” exception to 
the Miranda warnings requirement). 
 32. 417 U.S. 433, 445–46, 450–52 (1974) (ruling that the fruit of the poi-
sonous tree doctrine does not apply with full force to Miranda violations). 
 33. 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (holding that Miranda is a constitutional 
prophylactic rule that cannot be overruled by an act of Congress). 
 34. 542 U.S. 630, 642 (2004) (holding that the “fruit of the poisonous tree” 
doctrine does not apply to Miranda warnings). 
 35. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 505–08, 515. 
 36. Id. at 508. The complicated process by which the Court achieved these 
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Today, the Miranda warnings are most accurately consid-
ered a judge-made, prophylactic rule, the application of which 
can be subjected to a balancing test.37 While the warnings have 
a “constitutional basis,”38 no longer is each warning tied to the 
Self-Incrimination Clause with a unique and clearly defined 
role to play in dissipating the “inherent compulsions of the in-
terrogation process” described in Miranda.39 Rather, in a less-
defined manner, the recitation-and-waiver process now simply 
creates a presumption of voluntariness and admissibility.40 
While the Court has never directly held that the content of 
the warnings are subject to modification, the detachment of the 
warnings from the concept of Miranda-compulsion, and the re-
casting of the warnings requirement as a flexible, prophylactic 
rule, create leeway for modification. The authority supporting 
modification will be explored in more detail in Part II. Before 
turning to that discussion, however, it is imperative to first ex-
plore the post-Miranda changes in law and practical knowledge 
that create a foundation for the proposed modifications. These 
changes are discussed in turn in Parts B and C below. 
B. USING A SUSPECT’S POST-MIRANDA WARNING SILENCE 
AGAINST HER 
1. Legal Developments 
At the time that Miranda was decided, the law was not 
clear as to whether a suspect’s silence after receiving the warn-
ings could be used against her at trial as evidence of guilt. 
However, one could infer from the Court’s teachings that such 
use of silence was probably impermissible. In Miranda, for ex-
ample, the Court implied that the first warning, “You have a 
right to remain silent,” was required in part because a rational 
suspect might otherwise conclude that “silence in the face of ac-
cusation is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a 
jury.”41 From this somewhat vague statement, one can glean  
 
 
results is beyond the scope of this Article. For a full discussion of this trans-
formation, see id. at 505–15. 
 37. See id. at 507. 
 38. Id. at 512; see also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441. 
 39. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–74 (1966). 
 40. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 513; see also infra notes 111–15 and ac-
companying text (discussing the presumption of voluntariness). 
 41. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. 
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that perhaps the Court viewed the first warning as carrying 
with it an implicit promise that silence will not later be used 
against the suspect at trial.42 The Miranda Court apparently 
believed that this implicit promise worked in hand with the ex-
plicit warnings to dissipate the coercion inherent in custodial 
interrogation. 
Also, in Griffin v. California,43 decided the term prior to 
Miranda, the Court held that when a defendant invokes his 
Fifth Amendment right not to testify at trial, the prosecutor 
and judge cannot suggest to the jury that it consider such si-
lence as indicative of guilt.44 Griffin is not directly on point, 
however, because the Court has interpreted the Self-
Incrimination Clause in the formal context such as trials in a 
very different manner than it has interpreted the same clause 
in the pretrial interrogation context.45 Nonetheless, Griffin 
provided some support by analogy to the argument that a sus-
pect’s interrogation silence could likewise not be used against 
her at trial.46 
It was not until Doyle v. Ohio47 in 1976, however, that the 
Court expressly held that a suspect’s decision to remain silent 
during an interrogation, after the recitation of Miranda warn-
ings, could not be used against her by the prosecution at trial to 
infer guilt.48 Although the precise holding in Doyle was that the 
prosecution cannot use such silence to impeach the defendant,49 
nearly all courts have agreed that this holding carries with it 
the obvious implication that post-warning silence likewise can-
not be used by the prosecution in its case-in-chief.50 The Court 
in Doyle “stressed that the warnings carry at least an implicit 
assurance that silence will not be used against the arrestee— 
 
 
 42. The Miranda Court provided a glimpse of what was to come in dicta 
buried in an obscure footnote, stating, “[I]t is impermissible to penalize an in-
dividual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police 
custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not . . . use at trial the fact that 
he stood mute or claimed his privilege . . . .” See id. at 468 n.37. 
 43. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
 44. Id. at 615. 
 45. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 492–95, 502–05, 515–17. 
 46. See Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 111 & n.42, 134 
(2001). 
 47. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
 48. Id. at 617–18. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Strauss, supra note 46, at 112 n.43 (citing cases). 
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that the exercise of the right to remain silent carries no pen-
alty.”51 
The implicit nature of the assurance is apparently derived 
from the fact that the warnings describe the suspect’s decision 
to remain silent as a “right.” While this inference is perhaps 
less than obvious, the expectation of the Miranda Court was 
that suspects will understand that if their silence were to be 
used against them later, then their decision to remain silent is 
not really much of a right at all. In other words, because silence 
is couched as a “right,” suspects will conclude that their silence 
will not be used against them. The prosecution’s act of breaking 
this implied promise by introducing the suspect’s silence into 
evidence at trial, therefore, is “fundamentally unfair” and con-
stitutes a deprivation of due process.52 
2. Practical Experience 
Forty years of experience has shown that the substantive 
right the Doyle Court believed was implicit in the Miranda 
warnings—that silence will not be later used against the sus-
pect—is not recognized or understood by most suspects under-
going custodial interrogation. In what likely would have been a 
major surprise to the Miranda court,53 modern studies demon-
strate that roughly eighty percent of suspects waive their 
Miranda rights and talk to the police.54 These individuals have 
 
 51. Id. at 110. 
 52. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618. The Doyle decision was grounded in due proc-
ess rather than the Self-Incrimination Clause. Id. at 619. Because the use of 
post-Miranda warning silence to infer guilt at trial constitutes an impermissi-
ble penalty, the Doyle Court could have grounded its decision in the Self-
Incrimination Clause. See generally Godsey, supra note 20, at 515–17 (propos-
ing an objective penalty test for compulsion in interrogation). 
 53. See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 
1448 (1985) (noting that the Miranda Court anticipated that waiver would oc-
cur rarely and only in extraordinary cases); George C. Thomas III, Stories 
About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1977 (2004) (suggesting that the 
Miranda Court would have been “stunned” by waiver rates). 
 54. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 
1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 
842, 860 tbl.3 (1996) (waiver rate of eighty-four percent); id. at 843–49 (dis-
cussing various studies on the effects of Miranda); Richard A. Leo, Inside the 
Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 tbl.3 (1996) [here-
inafter Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room] (waiver rate of seventy-eight per-
cent); Thomas, supra note 53, at 1972 tbl.2 (waiver rate of sixty-eight percent). 
See generally Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs, supra note 2 (discussing results 
of various empirical studies of Miranda’s impact, with focus on “lost confes-
sions” rate); Leo, supra note 2, at 632–52 (same); Schulhofer, supra note 2 
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been informed that they may remain silent and have the guid-
ance of an attorney, yet they choose to go it alone and talk. 
While many reasons certainly contribute to the willingness of 
Mirandized suspects to talk to the police,55 a major factor un-
doubtedly is that many suspects naturally believe, albeit incor-
rectly, that remaining silent will make them “look guilty” and 
will be used against them as evidence of guilt. 
Indeed, common sense and everyday intuition suggest that 
the fear of silence being used as a penalty plays an important 
role in this phenomenon. Philosopher Jeremy Bentham once 
expressed, “[S]ilence . . . by common sense, at the report of uni-
versal experience, [is] certified to be tantamount to confes-
sion.”56 The fact that suspects naturally assume that their si-
lence will be used against them is captured in Kent 
Greenawalt’s classic essay, Silence as a Moral and Constitu-
tional Right.57 Greenawalt sets forth a hypothetical in which 
Ann has evidence to conclude that her friend Betty has stolen 
her bracelet.58 If Ann confronts Betty with the charge, and 
Betty remains silent, Ann should, based on common sense and 
everyday conceptions of morality, “rightly perceive Betty’s si-
lence . . . as substantially probative of guilt; . . . no possible bar 
will exist to her according silence the weight it naturally has in 
this context. . . . Ann would be justified in acting as if Betty had 
committed the original wrong.”59 
Silence in the face of accusation so intuitively carries the 
label of guilt that the criminal courts of England allow jurors to 
infer guilt in cases where the defendant was questioned by the 
police and refused to talk.60 The fact that the law in the United 
 
(same). 
 55. See PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS 8–64 (2000) (discussing 
some of the deep-seated psychological and cultural reasons why suspects 
choose to speak to the police and confess); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions 
Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 1826, 1828–29 (1987) (discussing a suspect’s “almost irresistible impulse 
to respond to . . . accusations”); Claudio Salas, Note, The Case for Excluding 
the Criminal Confessions of the Mentally Ill, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243, 254–
55 (2004) (listing reasons why suspects feel compelled to confess). 
 56. 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 39 (John Bow-
ring ed., Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962) (1838). 
 57. R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 15 (1981). 
 58. See id. at 22. 
 59. Id. at 25. 
 60. See Gregory W. O’Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and 
Moves Toward an Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
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States recently prohibited such use of silence is counterintui-
tive to this natural human instinct, and would therefore proba-
bly not be obvious or apparent to most American suspects with-
out having it expressly stated to them. Because the outdated 
Miranda warnings do not disabuse suspects of this erroneous 
assumption, suspects waive their rights and talk “just to avoid 
the guilty implication of silence.”61 
Research findings back up this claim. Richard J. Ofshe and 
Richard A. Leo, two of the leading empirical researchers of 
Miranda and its impact, have written that suspects tend to 
waive their Miranda rights and speak to the police at a high 
rate in part because they “view invoking Miranda as either 
wrong and/or tantamount to an admission of guilt.”62 Even the 
educated are sometimes unable to grasp the “implicit promise” 
of Miranda. Indeed, Ofshe and Leo cite an example of a middle-
class university student who provided the following reason why 
he waived his rights: “Somehow it seems—it feels to me that if 
I ask for a lawyer that I’m admitting guilt and I know I’m not, 
but it’s, you know, it’s just a preposterous idea to me that it’s 
even considered.”63 
The findings of Ofshe and Leo are buttressed by an exami-
nation of materials and pamphlets produced by criminal de-
fense attorneys for their potential clients. One example is a 
pamphlet prepared by attorney Katya Komisaruk for the Just 
Cause Law Collective entitled, What To Do if You’re Ap-
proached for Questioning by the FBI or Other Law Enforcement 
Agencies.64 The pamphlet goes to great length to disabuse po-
tential suspects of the natural but mistaken belief that silence 
will be used against them: 
Exercising your right to remain silent doesn’t make you seem guilty 
. . . . To make sure that no one is punished for remaining silent, the 
authorities are forbidden to use your refusal to answer questions as 
 
OGY 402, 428–29, 445 (1994). 
 61. See Salas, supra note 55, at 255. 
 62. Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: 
Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 1002 (1997); 
see also MALIN ÅKERSTRÖM, BETRAYAL AND BETRAYERS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
TREACHERY 71 (1991) (“The inmates I interviewed all believed that silence 
during an interrogation was interpreted as guilt.”). 
 63. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 62, at 1002. 
 64. KATYA KOMISARUK, JUST CAUSE LAW COLLECTIVE, WHAT TO DO IF 
YOU’RE APPROACHED FOR QUESTIONING BY THE FBI OR OTHER LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AGENCIES (2003), available at http://www.adcsf.org/ 
HandlingFBIDraft03-24-03.pdf. 
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an excuse for searching or arresting you. And in court, judges will de-
clare a mistrial if the prosecutor even implies that your being silent 
means you’re guilty.65 
This pamphlet and others of similar ilk66 suggest that 
criminal defense attorneys, with years of experience represent-
ing clients who have confessed after receiving Miranda warn-
ings, know that their clients often waive their rights and talk 
simply because they are not informed of all of their relevant 
rights.67 In particular, suspects do not understand that they 
have nothing to lose by remaining silent. Criminal defense at-
torneys find it necessary to supplement the warnings with this 
important new right that the Miranda warnings continue to 
omit.68 
In sum, suspects who remain silent in the face of Miranda 
warnings cannot be penalized for doing so in light of law that 
developed a decade after Miranda was decided. Yet suspects 
remain uninformed of this fact. Common sense and research 
 
 65. Id. at 3; see also Scott Turow, Miranda’s Value in the Trenches, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 2000, at A27 (“Confronted with an accusation, most people 
can’t resist the impulse to explain, probably fearing that remaining silent 
would make them look guilty.”). 
 66. See, e.g., CMTY. LEGAL EDUC. ONTARIO, TALKING TO POLICE 4 (2002), 
available at http://www.cleo.on.ca/english/pub/onpub/pdf/youth/talking.pdf 
(“Your right to remain silent won’t be used against you. You might worry 
about what will happen if you refuse to talk to the police. You might think it 
will make you look guilty, or that it will be held against you. It won’t.”); Kelly 
W. Parker, The Right to Remain Silent: What You Should Know (2000), 
http://library.findlaw.com/2000/Feb/1/132011.html (“It is always instructive to 
remember there is no penalty that can be imposed for exercising your right to 
remain silent. The fact that you exercised this right cannot be used against 
you at trial.”). 
 67. See Ogletree, supra note 55, at 1828 (describing his experience with 
clients who, “notwithstanding the warnings,” believed that their silence could 
either be used against them as evidence of guilt or would forfeit their opportu-
nity for pretrial release). 
 68. In a paper prepared for a January 25, 2003, education program for the 
Law Society of Upper Canada, a Canadian criminal defense attorney in-
structed: 
In addition to the basic advice set out above, experience suggests that 
it will be helpful to the client if you go further in your discussion of 
their right to remain silent. I always reinforce with clients that the 
fact that they choose to remain silent cannot be introduced in evi-
dence against them. People are always concerned that they will look 
guilty if they do not talk to the police. Tell them this is not so. The 
fact that they remain silent will seldom be admissible in evidence. 
FLETCHER DAWSON, THE POLICE ARE ON YOUR CLIENT’S DOORSTEP: WHAT 
CIVIL LITIGATORS NEED TO KNOW (2003), available at http://www 
.cohenhighley.com/articles/crimlaw002.htm. 
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findings suggest that the Court is incorrect in assuming that 
suspects recognize and understand this “implicit” right. Sus-
pects waive their rights and speak at a high rate in part be-
cause they fear that if they remain silent, the inference of guilt 
will be drawn against them.69 This fear may constitute the type 
of compulsion that the Self-Incrimination Clause prohibits. Ac-
cordingly, the warnings as currently constructed are not effec-
tive in dispelling the inherent coercion of custodial interroga-
tion that the Court envisioned in Miranda. Whether these more 
recent legal changes and modern research findings lead to the 
conclusion that a new warning should be added to the Miranda 
litany will be discussed in Part II. 
C. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING INTERROGATIONS 
As previously noted, the Miranda Court envisioned the 
right to counsel warnings playing several important roles in 
ensuring that coercion did not seep back into the interrogation 
room as the interview progressed, so that the suspect would 
have a “continuous opportunity to exercise” the right to remain 
silent.70 First, the physical presence of the suspect’s own coun-
sel would ensure that she does not become overwhelmed by the 
ongoing interrogation and forget her right to remain silent or 
become too intimidated to invoke it.71 Counsel would be by her 
side to keep her calm and remind her of this fundamental right 
when the police begin to tighten the screws. The Court also be-
lieved that the presence of a defense attorney in the interroga-
 
 69. Commentator Alexander Nguyen summed up this phenomenon per-
fectly: 
Miranda never really addressed the most important of the “inherently 
compelling pressures” of police interrogations: the belief that if sus-
pects keep quiet, they will look guilty. The root of this problem may 
be in the wording of Miranda itself. The warnings indicate the conse-
quences of talking to the police (“Anything you say may be used 
against you in a court of law”). But they do not indicate the conse-
quences of refusing to answer questions—which, in theory, should be 
nothing other than the continued presumption of innocence. It may be 
ignorance of this fact that causes suspects to waive their rights at 
such a high rate. 
Alexander Nguyen, The Assault on Miranda, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27–Apr. 10, 
2000, at 61 (emphasis added); see also Timothy O’Neill, Why Miranda Does Not 
Prevent Confessions: Some Lessons From Albert Camus, Arthur Miller and 
Oprah Winfrey, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 863, 873 (2001) (arguing that the fact 
that silence appears damning to most suspects contributes to high Miranda 
warning waiver rates). 
 70. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 490 (1966). 
 71. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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tion room would restrain the police from engaging in third-
degree tactics, would supply the suspect with a witness to any 
nefarious police conduct, and would guarantee that the suspect 
gives an accurate statement that is properly memorialized, 
without the police stretching it to suit their purposes.72 
Thus, the Miranda Court’s analysis of the right to counsel 
warnings hinged on two factual assumptions: first, that sus-
pects would freely invoke their right to counsel, and second, 
that when they did invoke their right, the police would supply 
counsel to suspects and then continue the interrogations in the 
presence of counsel. Indeed, none of the coercion-lessening 
benefits of the right to counsel outlined by the Miranda Court 
are present unless a defense attorney occupies the interroga-
tion room with the suspect. The Miranda Court, of course, was 
operating without extensive factual knowledge of how the right 
to counsel warnings would operate in the real world and, thus, 
was in large part speculating as to their practical effect.73 
Forty years of experience has demonstrated that the 
Court’s factual assumptions were incorrect. In the vast major-
ity of interrogations in which a suspect invokes her right to 
counsel, no attorney is provided. Indeed, a careful reading of 
Miranda demonstrates that it does not require that an attorney 
be supplied to the suspect; an attorney is mandated only if the 
police wish to continue the interrogation after the suspect in-
vokes her rights. The law enforcement community has learned 
through experience that if an attorney is contacted or obtained 
for the suspect, the defense attorney invariably advises the 
suspect to remain silent and the interrogation ends.74 Rather 
 
 72. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 73. As described in Miranda, the FBI had been advising suspects of their 
right to remain silent and right to an attorney for more than a decade prior to 
the Miranda decision. 384 U.S. at 483–86. In addition, the FBI began advising 
indigent suspects of their right to a state-appointed attorney two years before 
Miranda was decided. Id. at 484–85. The information supplied to the Miranda 
Court regarding how these warnings worked in practice suggested to the 
Court that when the FBI advises a suspect of her right to remain silent and 
right to an attorney, the suspect is allowed access to counsel if counsel appears 
or can be reached by telephone. Id. at 485. The Miranda opinion does not ad-
dress whether or not interrogation typically resumes after the suspect has 
consulted with an attorney, id. at 483–86, but the Court’s analysis suggests 
that the Court assumed interrogations would typically proceed with counsel 
present. 
 74. Even a Justice of the Supreme Court has argued that any criminal de-
fense attorney “worth his salt” will advise his client to remain silent rather 
than submit to police interrogation. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 
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than waste time going through the elaborate ceremony of con-
tacting the suspect’s attorney or having an attorney appointed 
for her by the court, waiting while the suspect meets with her 
attorney and then announces that she will no longer submit to 
interrogation, the police take the obvious shortcut and termi-
nate the interrogation when a suspect invokes the right to 
counsel, without bothering to fulfill her request for an attor-
ney.75 In the end, a suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel 
performs none of the functions intended by the Miranda Court, 
but simply operates as an alternative way—in addition to in-
 
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also M.K.B. 
Darmer, Lessons From the Lindh Case: Public Safety and the Fifth Amend-
ment, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 259 (2002) (“Because counsel could be relied 
upon to advise her client to demur to questioning, the Court essentially re-
quired the government to thwart its own investigations.”); Louis Michael 
Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 734–35 (1992) (“Virtually 
any competent lawyer would advise his client in the strongest possible terms 
to remain silent, and it would be a rare client indeed who would disregard 
such advice.”); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence From the Mind of the Criminal 
Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1161 n.90 (1987) (noting that Professor Anthony Am-
sterdam, in his treatise TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES, 
§ 87 (1984), “recommends that defense counsel advise their clients at the ini-
tial interview to say nothing at all to the police or prosecuting attorneys under 
any circumstances, and not to discuss the case with anyone, particularly not 
cellmates, codefendants, colawyers, or reporters.”); id. at 1177 n.144 (“Natu-
rally . . . instances of an attorney advising her accused client to participate in 
an interview with law enforcement officials seeking to gain evidence 
incriminating the client should be relatively rare.”); Gordon Van Kessel, Euro-
pean Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence, 100 W. 
VA. L. REV. 799, 815 (1998) (explaining that although criminal defense attor-
neys in Europe typically advise their clients to speak to the police, American 
defense attorneys “virtually always” terminate the police interrogation). On 
several occasions prior to Miranda, the Court recognized that defense attor-
neys summoned to the interrogation room would likely advise their clients to 
terminate the interview. See Caplan, supra note 53, at 1424 (quoting several 
Supreme Court opinions that made this point prior to the Miranda decision). 
 75. See O’Neill, supra note 69, at 874 n.100 (“In reality, the Miranda 
promise of a right to counsel is somewhat illusory. If a suspect asks for coun-
sel, police will usually end all attempts at interrogation. Since the police know 
that an attorney will simply tell the suspect not to answer questions, it is eas-
ier to simply stop attempts to interrogate.”); see also Leo, Inside the Interroga-
tion Room, supra note 54, at 276–78 (reporting the results of an empirical 
study showing that when a suspect invoked one or more Miranda rights, the 
officer typically terminated the interrogation and returned the suspect to jail 
without supplying an attorney; in a few instances, the officer continued ques-
tioning the suspect after invocation of rights without providing an attorney). 
An additional reason why suspects are not provided with counsel is that in 
many states no mechanism exists for obtaining counsel for indigent suspects 
who have not yet been charged with a crime. 
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voking the right to remain silent—for a suspect to terminate 
the interrogation sans attorney.76 
It is also important to consider the right to counsel warn-
ings in the historical context in which they were created. 
Miranda purported to provide suspects with a Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel, designed to effectuate the policies of the 
Self-Incrimination Clause by ensuring that suspects have a 
“continuous opportunity to exercise” the right to remain si-
lent.77 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, on the other 
hand, is a distinct right that differs in substance and policy 
from the right to counsel guaranteed under Miranda and under 
 
 76. The dissenters in Miranda did not take the majority’s assertions that 
counsel would be provided at face value. Justice White, joined by Justices 
Harlan and Stewart, argued: 
The obvious underpinning of the Court’s decision is a deep-seated dis-
trust of all confessions. As the Court declares that the accused may 
not be interrogated without counsel present, absent a waiver of the 
right to counsel, and as the Court all but admonishes the lawyer to 
advise the accused to remain silent, the result adds up to a judicial 
judgment that evidence from the accused should not be used against 
him in any way, whether compelled or not. This is the not so subtle 
overtone of the opinion—that it is inherently wrong for the police to 
gather evidence from the accused himself. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 537–38 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissenters sug-
gested that the Miranda majority was being disingenuous and knew, or at 
least suspected, that the right to counsel warnings would not work in practice 
in the manner suggested by the majority. 
Professor Gerald Caplan, on the other hand, has argued: 
[A]s naive as it now appears, the Court expected the presence of coun-
sel at the station house to be routine and the waiver of rights extraor-
dinary. The Court probably imagined that the typical suspect advised 
of his rights would elect to exercise them. He would choose to speak to 
counsel rather than to police, and counsel would ordinarily be pro-
vided to the indigent as an alternative to foregoing interrogation alto-
gether. Once summoned, counsel might “advise his client not to talk 
to police until he has an opportunity to investigate the case, or he 
may wish to be present during any police questioning.” 
Caplan, supra note 53, at 1448–49 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480); see also 
Bernard Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 
in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 153, 179 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 
1962) (written prior to the Miranda decision and suggesting that although de-
fense counsel would ordinarily advise his client to remain silent, it is “not un-
reasonable to suppose that in many cases where the suspect is innocent,” the 
lawyer would participate in the interrogation with his client in the manner 
that the Miranda Court later envisioned). Because this Article evaluates the 
right to counsel warnings in light of the theoretical justification provided by 
the Miranda majority, and evaluates that justification in light of four decades 
of experience, it is imperative to take the Miranda majority’s theory at face 
value to determine whether it stands the test of time. 
 77. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
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the Self-Incrimination Clause.78 At the time of the Miranda 
decision, it was unclear whether suspects had, or might even-
tually gain, a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at early stages 
of a criminal investigation, such as the interrogation stage. 
While the Court’s holding in 1964 in Escobedo v. Illinois79 
hinted that the Court might eventually grant suspects that 
right,80 the Miranda decision recast Escobedo as a Fifth 
Amendment decision.81 Yet the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel was still evolving when the Court decided Miranda, 
and its application to the interrogation setting was far from 
settled doctrine. 
It was not until 1972, in Kirby v. Illinois,82 that the Court 
finally clarified the application of the Sixth Amendment’s right 
to counsel. Kirby held that the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel is triggered only “at or after the time that adversary judicial 
criminal proceedings have been initiated against [the suspect],” 
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indict-
ment, information, or arraignment.”83 The practical effect of 
this holding was to make the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel inapplicable in the vast majority of Miranda-type interroga-
tions. 
With this history, it is possible to see the right to counsel 
warnings in Miranda as derived from the Fifth Amendment but 
created by a Court that, in 1966, perhaps envisioned a future 
role of the Sixth Amendment in some investigative stages of the 
criminal process. The warnings could be seen as a method of 
protecting the Self-Incrimination Clause. Alternatively, if the 
Court’s assumptions about how these warnings would work in 
practice were incorrect, the warnings could function as a 
method of giving suspects notice of their substantive, Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. If the suspect invoked her right to 
counsel, and the police did not want to continue the interroga- 
 
 
 78. See George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 
and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231, 282–88 (1988) (stating 
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is substantively different than the 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel); see also JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, 
TRUTH, AND THE LAW 145 (1993) (discussing the differences between the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment right to counsel). 
 79. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
 80. See id. at 485–91. 
 81. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464–66. 
 82. 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
 83. Id. at 688. 
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tion in the presence of a defense attorney, the warning would 
still be relevant as a formal notice of that Sixth Amendment 
right. At that point, an attorney would be provided to the sus-
pect regardless of whether or not the interrogation continued.84 
The Kirby decision, however, eradicated the Sixth Amend-
ment’s chances of landing a leading role in the investigative 
stages of the criminal process. Kirby, therefore, left the Self-
Incrimination Clause as the sole provision in the Bill of Rights 
on which the right to counsel warnings could justify their valid-
ity. Because history has proven that these warnings do not per-
form their Fifth Amendment function as the Court originally 
envisioned, they struggle to find legitimacy in modern applica-
tion. 
Whether the right to counsel warnings can still be justified 
and find some validity under more modern interpretations of 
Miranda and confession law, or whether the policies behind the 
warnings could be better served by moving in another direction, 
will be explored below in Part II. 
II.  THE IMPACT OF MODERN DEVELOPMENTS  
ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WARNINGS 
A. THE IMPACT OF MODERN DEVELOPMENTS ANALYZED UNDER 
MIRANDA’S ORIGINAL COMPULSION THEORY 
As stated above, the Miranda decision was grounded in the 
Self-Incrimination Clause and its prohibition on police use of 
“compulsion” to obtain a confession. The Court equated the co-
ercion inherent in custodial interrogation with unconstitutional 
compulsion.85 The Court advised, however, that the compulsion 
could be dispelled, and custodial interrogation could ensue, if 
the police first provided the suspect with the required warnings 
and obtained a waiver.86 
 
 
 84. Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is self-executing, a 
suspect would not have to request counsel to be afforded this right were the 
Sixth Amendment held to apply to pretrial interrogations. See Brewer v. Wil-
liams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); see also Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different 
Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE 
L.J. 259, 295 (1993) (describing the self-executing nature of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel). 
 85. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–74. 
 86. Id. at 467–75. 
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Analyzed under Miranda’s original compulsion paradigm,87 
the first two warnings, relating to the right to remain silent, 
continue to play the important role in dispelling the coercion 
that the Miranda Court envisioned. The two right to silence 
warnings help to dissipate coercion by informing the suspect of 
her rights. The warnings let her know that while it may appear 
that the interrogators hold all the cards, she holds a trump 
card embossed with the power of the Fifth Amendment. The 
first two warnings also inform her of the consequences of 
speaking, so that she can make an informed choice. Certainly, 
suspects today feel less pressure and are in a better position to 
control their destinies in the stationhouse interrogation room 
than they would be without knowing of their right to remain 
silent or of the consequences of speaking. 
But legal developments and empirical findings over the 
past four decades demonstrate that the right to silence warn-
ings, as currently formulated, are not completely up to the task. 
Suspects are informed of their right to remain silent and the 
consequences of speaking. Yet, they are not informed of the 
consequences of remaining silent—even though the Court has 
now expressly recognized that the choice of silence by a Miran-
dized suspect cannot be used as evidence of guilt.88 Thus, sus-
pects are only partially informed of the legal consequences of 
their choice to speak or remain silent. Indeed, if it is essential 
that suspects know the consequences of speaking, then it is 
equally essential, if not more so, that they also know that no 
formal consequences will follow from their silence, and that 
they can exercise that right without penalty. 
The Miranda Court may have agreed with this point in 
theory, but believed that the fact that silence carries no penalty 
was “implicit” and thus did not need to be expressly stated.89 
The Miranda Court was incorrect in this assumption. Common 
sense and empirical findings support the notion that this “im-
plicit promise” does not register with suspects, and that 
suspects waive their Miranda rights at a surprisingly high rate 
 
 87. As the Supreme Court modified its interpretation of “compulsion” in 
subsequent decisions, the objective compulsion test set out by the Miranda 
Court has morphed into a subjective voluntariness test. See Godsey, supra 
note 20, at 505–15. Part II.A considers the proposed modifications under the 
original compulsion theory. Part II.B considers the proposed modifications un-
der a voluntariness standard. 
 88. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976). 
 89. See 384 U.S. at 468–69. 
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because they erroneously conclude that their silence will be 
damning and will have penalizing implications.90 This fear of 
penalty, or pressure to speak to avoid this implication, consti-
tutes compulsion as described in Miranda. 
In order to fill this glaring hole that the past four decades 
have illuminated, a new right to silence warning should be 
added. This warning should state something to the effect of: “If 
you choose to remain silent at the beginning or at any time dur-
ing the interview, your silence will not be used against you as 
evidence to suggest that you committed a crime simply because 
you refused to speak.” 
The right to counsel warnings, on the other hand, were de-
signed primarily to ensure that the suspect could have a cham-
pion for her rights who would keep her from becoming too in-
timidated to invoke her right to remain silent as the 
interrogation progressed, so that she would maintain a “con-
tinuous opportunity to exercise” her right to remain silent.91 
Forty years of experience has demonstrated that the right to 
counsel warnings do not serve this purpose.92 Suspects who in-
voke the right to counsel are not supplied with an attorney, and 
none of the benefits listed in the Miranda decision are realized. 
The right to counsel warnings act in practice as a restatement 
of the right to remain silent in a different form which, cumula-
tive in nature with the first two warnings, offer the suspect a 
second means of terminating the interrogation. None of the co-
ercion-dispelling benefits that the Miranda Court imagined 
have come to fruition in the rough-and-tumble world of the sta-
tionhouse interrogation room. 
One can argue that while the right to counsel warnings 
have not had their intended effect, they still work to dispel co-
ercion in other ways.93 For example, a suspect undergoing in-
 
 90. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 91. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
 92. See supra Part I.C. 
 93. In 1965, Professor Yale Kamisar set forth an equal protection theory 
for the right to counsel warnings. See Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gate-
houses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure: From Powell to 
Gideon, From Escobedo to . . . , in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 3–11, 64–81 
(A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965); see also George C. Thomas III, Separated at 
Birth But Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1092 (2001) (summarizing Kamisar’s equal protection 
theory). Under Kamisar’s equal protection theory, one could arguably find a 
legitimate home for the right to counsel warnings. Indeed, a wealthy suspect 
undergoing custodial interrogation might more naturally request counsel on 
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terrogation might not realize that her Miranda right to counsel 
is in reality an empty promise, and the false belief that she has 
a right to an attorney (if she so chooses) might make her feel 
more confident in the interrogation room.94 Also, when a sus-
pect invokes her right to counsel, the rules regarding when the 
police can reengage the suspect are more protective than when 
a suspect merely invokes the right to remain silent.95 Thus, the 
 
her own. For example, she may have previously retained an attorney for such 
occasions who had earlier advised her to “lawyer up” if the police attempt to 
question her. Advising indigent suspects that they are entitled to the services 
of an attorney for free, therefore, would theoretically put such suspects on 
equal footing with their more affluent counterparts, because it informs them 
that this possibility exists for them as well. One problem with this argument, 
however, is that counsel is not in fact provided during interrogations for rich 
or poor, as interrogations typically terminate when the right to counsel is in-
voked. The counterargument is that because wealthy suspects will often al-
ready have counsel and may have been advised to invoke that right by their 
attorney, they have a greater ability to terminate interrogations through this 
method than do indigent suspects to whom, without being told that the ser-
vices of an attorney are free of charge, the idea of demanding the presence of 
counsel might seem fanciful. Thus, Kamisar’s equal protection theory provides 
some support for the right to counsel warnings. 
 94. See O’Neill, supra note 69, at 874 n.100 (stating that suspects are of-
ten unaware that the Miranda right to counsel is illusory, and falsely believe 
that if they request an attorney, the police will provide one for them). 
 95. See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal 
for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 88–89 (1989) 
(discussing varying rules for when a suspect invokes the right to counsel as 
opposed to the right to silence, and stating: “Subsequent cases have, however, 
treated these two prongs somewhat differently. Invocation of the right to si-
lence has not resulted in either a per se prohibition of further interrogation or 
any other measures designed to overcome the effects of continued detention 
and resumption of questioning. All that appears to be necessary, at least when 
the resumed questioning relates to another crime, is a renewed warning after 
a relatively brief respite. When, however, the defendant asks for an attorney, 
the police cannot initiate further interrogation as to either that offense or an 
unrelated crime. Although it is true that the Court perhaps has been too eager 
to find suspect-initiated interrogation, it also has ruled that once a suspect re-
quests counsel, her subsequent responses cannot be used to show that the ini-
tial request for counsel was ambiguous. The difference in treatment of these 
two facets of the Miranda warnings may reflect that the Miranda Court itself 
was more explicit about the effect to be given a suspect's request for a lawyer, 
or that the Court traditionally has been more protective of the right to counsel 
than of the right to remain silent.”). In addition, one could argue that the right 
to counsel warnings reduce coercion by providing the suspect with a less con-
frontational, and thus preferred, method of invoking the right to remain silent. 
Indeed, it may be easier for some suspects to assert that they would like to 
talk to an attorney rather than to simply stop talking. While this is undoubt-
edly a valid point, the coercion-lessening benefits of this reality are not as ex-
tensive as the Court envisioned in Miranda, and I believe that the policies be-
hind the right to counsel warnings could be better effectuated by moving in a 
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argument goes, the right to counsel warnings still provide some 
protections to suspects undergoing custodial interrogation that 
lessen the coercion to some degree. 
One could further argue that in some rare instances when 
a suspect invokes the right to counsel, an attorney is in fact 
provided and the interrogation ensues with the attorney pre-
sent. In those cases, the benefits of the presence of counsel de-
lineated in Miranda are present. Indeed, if the police have a 
strong case against a suspect but are interested in affording 
her leniency in order to convince her to cooperate against other 
potential suspects, the police may prefer to have a criminal de-
fense attorney with her in the interrogation room. In instances 
where the police and prosecutors are willing to offer immunity 
or an incredible deal to a suspect if she implicates others, a 
criminal defense attorney can be helpful to the police because 
he will explain to the suspect that she is in a lot of trouble and 
that what is being offered is too good to pass up.96 
The problem with this argument in favor of the right to 
counsel warnings, however, is that this same benefit could be 
obtained in situations where the suspect is not warned of her 
right to counsel and likewise refuses to cooperate. In such an 
instance, if the police believe the suspect is making a mistake 
that is not in her best interest, they can advise her that she 
should get an attorney—and even obtain one for her—so that 
the attorney could explain why talking might be in her best in-
terest.97 In other words, because the police and the suspect’s 
interests align in this context, the police will attempt to obtain  
new direction. 
 96. When I served as an Assistant United States Attorney, in many in-
stances we sought to arrest several members of a conspiracy and enlist one of 
them to cooperate and testify against the others in exchange for possible leni-
ency. In such instances, we would identify one conspirator to approach or ar-
rest first, with the hope of convincing her to cooperate and testify against the 
others or agree to record conversations with those conspirators still on the 
street and unaware of the investigation. When that scenario presented itself, 
we often invited the suspect to request counsel as soon as we approached her 
or as soon as she indicated an unwillingness to cooperate. When the incrimi-
nating evidence against this suspect was revealed to her defense counsel, 
along with the government’s willingness to “cut a deal” with her in exchange 
for cooperation, defense counsel almost invariably recognized that waiving 
Miranda rights and cooperating with the government was in the client’s best 
interest. Thus, the presence of counsel worked in favor of both the suspect and 
the prosecution. 
 97. Indeed, when the scenario described in the preceding footnote oc-
curred, the government would often have a prearranged plan to invite the 
suspect to invoke counsel, as the presence of counsel was seen as beneficial. 
Thus, suspects will be provided with counsel in these situations regardless of 
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interests align in this context, the police will attempt to obtain 
an attorney for the suspect regardless of whether or not she has 
been advised of her right to counsel. 
The fact remains, however, that in most interrogation sce-
narios, the right to counsel warnings provide none of their in-
tended benefits, and most of the unintended coercion-lessening 
benefits provided by the warnings are minimal or speculative 
at best.98 The Miranda Court required the right to counsel 
warnings primarily because the presence of counsel would en-
sure that suspects undergoing custodial interrogation have a 
“continuous opportunity to exercise” the right to remain si-
lent.99 This policy interest could perhaps be more effectively 
achieved when analyzed under a “compulsion” analysis of 
Miranda by replacing the right to counsel warnings with a new 
warning: “If you choose to talk, you may change your mind and 
remain silent at any time, even if you have already spoken.” 
This warning directly informs the suspect that just because she 
has decided to talk, that fact does not mean she cannot invoke 
her right to silence later if she begins to feel uncomfortable 
with the direction of the interrogation. This warning would, in 
part, play the role that her attorney would play in the interro-
gation room by reminding her that she can invoke her right to 
silence even after she has given a partial statement. The need 
for such a warning is so apparent that even some law enforce-
ment agencies have recognized its absence from the Miranda 
equation, and have recited a warning of this nature to suspects 
even though they are not required to do so by law.100 
 
whether the police are required by law to advise them of their right to counsel, 
as it is in the best interest of the police to do so. 
 98. The strict rules regarding reinitiating interrogation when a suspect 
invokes the right to counsel are substantial, see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477, 484–85 (1981), but these rules would still apply when the suspect is ad-
vised only that she has a right to remain silent but nevertheless asks for an 
attorney. Indeed, suspects ask for attorneys in some instances even when not 
advised of that right. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 479–82 
(1964) (involving a suspect who requested counsel during interrogation even 
though he was not advised of that right). 
 99. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
 100. For example, in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989), the officer 
in question used a standard waiver form created by his local police department 
which informed suspects that they could stop answering questions at any 
time, even if they had already answered some questions. Id. at 198. In addi-
tion, a prominent web-based company that sells equipment to police depart-
ments across the country advertises a “virtually indestructible” Miranda 
warning card which includes this “fifth” and additional warning: “You can de-
cide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make 
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The coercion could be further dispelled if the police were 
required to remind her of her right to silence and her right to 
terminate questioning at any time at intervals throughout the 
interrogation. A rule could be constructed that would require 
the police to obtain a written waiver of the right to remain si-
lent, for example, at the beginning of each hour of interroga-
tion. The suspect and the interrogator would sign the waiver 
form at the beginning of the interrogation, and each would 
place their initials next to the time of day at each interval at 
which the re-recitation of the rights took place.101 This proce-
dure would be far more effective in ensuring that suspects have 
a “continuous right to exercise” their right to remain silent 
throughout the duration of the interrogation than the illusory 
right to counsel warnings. While perhaps not as effective as 
having her own attorney remind her of this right at periodic in-
tervals, the reality is that defense attorneys do not perform this 
function as Miranda currently operates.102 A requirement that 
the interrogation must have periodic breaks where the suspect 
is reminded of her rights would reinforce the notion that she 
can invoke her right to silence at any time, and provide her 
with orchestrated lulls in the action. During these breaks, the 
suspect could collect her thoughts and reconsider her initial de-
cision to talk. 
In addition to ensuring that the suspect has a continuous 
right to exercise the right to remain silent, the Miranda Court 
listed some secondary functions of the right to counsel warn-
 
any statements.” Advertisement, Chief Supply, Miranda Warning Card, 
www.chiefsupply.com/miranda.phtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2006). The standard 
Miranda card used by the FBI includes a similar warning: “If you decide to 
answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop an-
swering at any time.” See F.B.I. Advice of Rights Form FD-395 (Feb. 28, 1997) 
(on file with author). 
 101. Most law enforcement agencies have preprinted cards containing the 
Miranda warnings. When a suspect is Mirandized, an officer reads the warn-
ings on the card to her, and if the suspect wishes to waive her rights and an-
swer questions, she is required to sign and date the card. Because this proce-
dure is already in widespread use across the country, it would not be difficult 
to add a requirement that the suspect place her initials and time of day on the 
card to verify the additional times during the interrogation at which she was 
re-advised of her rights. 
 102. An obvious alternative to the procedures set forth herein that might 
fulfill policies behind the right to counsel warnings would be to require police 
to actually provide attorneys to suspects during all custodial interrogations. 
Because such a rule would so significantly undermine the ability of the police 
to conduct interrogations, I do not consider this option to be a politically real-
istic alternative. 
GODSEY_3FMT 04/20/2006 10:25:48 AM 
808 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:781 
 
ings. Namely, that law enforcement officers would be less likely 
to engage in third-degree tactics if a criminal defense attorney 
were present; that if officers did engage in such conduct, the de-
fense attorney would be a witness to it; and finally, that the de-
fense attorney could ensure that his client gave an accurate 
statement to the police and that the officers properly memorial-
ized what was said, rather than spinning it in a way more help-
ful to their case.103 Again, the right to counsel warnings do not 
perform these intended functions, as the notion of counsel being 
present in the interrogation room has proved an illusory con-
cept in practice.104 
These subsidiary functions of the right to counsel warnings 
could be achieved, however, by prophylactically requiring the 
police to videotape custodial interrogations.105 Police officers 
would obviously be less likely to engage in third-degree tactics 
if they knew their conduct was being recorded and might be 
viewed by a judge or jury at a later time.106 In addition, a video-
tape of the interrogation would be the best evidence of exactly 
what the suspect said during the interrogation, leaving no room 
for creative interpretation.107 
 
 103. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470. 
 104. Another obvious option to cure this problem would be to actually re-
quire the physical presence of defense counsel, either by the Fifth or Sixth 
Amendments, in the interrogation room during all custodial interrogations. 
Although this is certainly a defensible alternative, it would essentially signal 
the end of custodial interrogation in this country. Because custodial interroga-
tion, when executed properly, is a very important tool for solving serious 
crimes, I would not support this alternative. Nor do I think that it is remotely 
feasible from a political standpoint. The Warren Court was not willing to go 
that route in Miranda, and the current Court certainly would not either. Thus, 
I recognize this option as a viable alternative but make the assumption in this 
Article that it is not a realistic option at the present time. 
 105. This requirement could be created as a prophylactic rule to enforce the 
Self-Incrimination Clause, or as a requirement of substantive due process. See 
Leo, supra note 2, at 681–92 (arguing that substantive due process requires 
videotaped interrogations). 
 106. See Joëlle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why the New Mis-
souri v. Seibert Police “Bad Faith” Test Is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 
417 (2005); see also Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons 
of History: The Need for Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accu-
rately Assess the Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. 
REV. 619, 628 (2004) (suggesting that the videotaping requirement would force 
police to “keep their own behavior in check”); Leo, supra note 2, at 683 
(asserting that police officers would “be more self-conscious about their con-
duct” were interrogations videotaped). 
 107. See Moreno, supra note 106, at 417 (stating that “[J]udges will make 
more accurate pretrial decisions when they can examine the most objective 
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Videotaping interrogations was not a realistic possibility at 
the time Miranda was decided but, of course, it is today.108 
While a videotaping requirement raises its own issues such as 
cost and practicality, several states have adopted this require-
ment through legislation or court decision,109 and many more 
states are currently considering bills mandating taped interro-
gations.110 While an exploration of precisely how a videotaping 
requirement would work would be an article in and of itself and 
thus is beyond the scope of this Article, suffice it to say that 
videotaping has been successfully employed in several states 
and, when administered with flexibility, has proven to be a 
helpful solution that would nicely complement the proposals set 
forth in this Article. Indeed, the proposed modifications to the 
Miranda warnings set forth herein, when coupled with a re-
quirement for videotaped interrogations, satisfy the various 
policy objectives underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause that 
the Miranda Court unsuccessfully attempted to achieve. 
In sum, when analyzed through the lens of Miranda’s 
original compulsion theory, and in light of legal developments 
 
and comprehensive factual evidence available,” and that “[v]ideotapes . . . re-
duce or eliminate problems of biased testimony, faulty or incomplete memo-
ries, and influential factors such as inflection and body language that cannot 
be transcribed.”); see also Drizin & Reich, supra note 106, at 622–28 (discuss-
ing procedural and evidentiary advantages of taped interrogations require-
ment); Leo, supra note 2, at 681–92 (discussing benefits of videotaped interro-
gation requirement). 
 108. See Moreno, supra note 106, at 417 (“Obviously, neither the Framers, 
nor the Warren Court, could have anticipated the myriad technological devel-
opments that have transformed criminal investigations and prosecutions. 
Videotape recorders provide a simple, inexpensive mechanism that, in effect, 
can expose the actions of the police by transporting a judge back in time, ena-
bling her to watch the interrogation.”); see also Leo, supra note 2, at 681–82 
(discussing fact that police departments already have the technological capa-
bility to videotape interrogations). State legislatures and scholars have de-
bated the various issues that arise with videotaping, such as cost and the 
availability (or lack thereof) of video cameras during unanticipated or emer-
gency questioning of suspects. See Leo, supra note 2, at 684–86 (discussing 
and rejecting various arguments against videotaping interrogations). 
 109. See Moreno, supra note 106, at 418 & nn.195–200 (observing that 
mandatory videotaping of all custodial interrogations is required in Alaska 
and Minnesota by judicial decision, and that recording of certain types of in-
terrogations is required in Illinois, Maine, Texas, and the District of Columbia 
by statute). 
 110. See id. at 418 & nn.176–94 (noting nineteen states that introduced 
bills mandating videotaping and/or audiotaping of interrogations in 2004 and 
2005); see also Drizin & Reich, supra note 106, at 639–45 (discussing the grow-
ing trend of jurisdictions requiring videotaped interrogations). 
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and knowledge gained over the past four decades, the Miranda 
warnings have not achieved their stated goals. Suspects waive 
their rights and talk to the police at a surprisingly high rate 
because the inherent compulsion has not been fully dispelled. 
The Miranda Court mistakenly believed that what it later 
called an “implicit promise”—that the decision to remain silent 
carries no penalty—would register with suspects, but history 
has proven that it does not. In order to effectuate the intended 
purpose of the warnings, a new warning should be added which 
expressly advises suspects that their silence carries no penalty. 
In addition, the right to counsel warnings do not perform 
their intended function. The policies underlying these warnings 
could be better served by: (1) informing the suspect that she 
can choose to remain silent at any time, even after she has 
started talking to the police; (2) requiring interrogators to 
reinform the suspect of her rights at periodic intervals during 
lengthy interrogations; and (3) requiring that the police video-
tape custodial interrogations. 
B. THE IMPACT OF MODERN DEVELOPMENTS ANALYZED UNDER 
THE DUE PROCESS VOLUNTARINESS THEORY 
In previous articles, I have thoroughly documented how 
the Court, in the last four decades, has slowly moved away 
from Miranda’s original compulsion theory as the underlying 
justification for the warnings.111 Instead of requiring the warn-
ings to dispel inherent coercion as described in the Miranda de-
cision, the Court now uses the warnings as a prophylactic rule 
to make easier the task of determining the “voluntariness” of a 
confession in the due process sense of that term.112 If Miranda 
warnings were provided and waived prior to the confession, the 
confession is seen as presumptively voluntary.113 If warnings 
were not provided and waived, then the confession is consid-
 
 111. See Godsey, supra note 6, at 1734–52; Godsey, supra note 20, at 505–
15; Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law—The 
International Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. 
Investigators from Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851, 863–67 (2003). 
 112. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 505–15. 
 113. Id. at 513 & n.267 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 
n.20 (1984), for its observation that “[c]ases in which a defendant can make a 
colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ de-
spite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of 
Miranda are rare”). 
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ered involuntary and inadmissible.114 In other words, the Court 
has unmoored the warnings from the Miranda concept of com-
pulsion, and now considers them a first-step litmus test for de-
termining the voluntariness of a confession.115 
The voluntariness test that now underpins the warnings 
has been described by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte.116 The test considers the totality of the circum-
stances in determining whether a suspect’s will was overborne 
by police conduct.117 It is a highly subjective test that considers 
not only the governmental conduct involved, but characteristics 
unique to the suspect, such as age, background, strength of 
character, and mental condition at the time.118 The primary fo-
cus of the test is on the state of mind of the suspect. Objective 
factors, such as the pressure applied by the police, are relevant, 
but only in respect to the effect such pressures had on the mind 
of the particular suspect under interrogation.119 Theoretically, 
therefore, a particularly hearty suspect could be deemed to 
have made a voluntary statement in the face of enormous pres-
sure, while a particularly weak suspect could be deemed to 
have made an involuntary statement in response to much 
lighter pressures.120 
Despite this change in underlying rationale, the Court has 
not reconsidered whether the warnings fit with, and are appro-
priate for, the voluntariness test it now espouses. Stated an-
other way, the warnings were designed with a specific compul-
sion theory in mind, as delineated in the Miranda decision. The 
compulsion theory of Miranda was objective in nature,121 and 
the Miranda Court arrived at its warnings by merely adopting 
 
 114. See id. at 508. 
 115. Id. 
 116. 412 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1973). 
 117. Id. at 225; see also Godsey, supra note 20, at 468–69. See generally 
Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against 
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1997) (discussing 
the history of the privilege and the involuntary confession rule). 
 118. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; see also Godsey, supra note 20, at 468–
69. 
 119. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 491. 
 120. See Yale Kamisar, What is an “Involuntary” Confession? Some Com-
ments on Inbau and Reid’s Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUT-
GERS L. REV. 728, 755–57 (1963) (“For if the Court means what it has said on a 
number of occasions, the ‘voluntariness’ test causes constitutionally permissi-
ble police interrogation to vary widely, according to the particular defendant 
concerned.”). 
 121. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 502. 
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verbatim the set of warnings that the FBI had started provid-
ing to suspects two years prior to its decision.122 While the test 
underlying the warnings has morphed through time from an 
objective compulsion standard to a highly subjective, all-
encompassing voluntariness test, the Court has not addressed 
whether this transformation should carry with it a modification 
of the warnings to better serve the new standard that the 
warnings are now intended to complement. 
The purpose of this Part, therefore, is to consider how the 
warnings might be reconstructed if the Court were to start 
from scratch and design them with a subjective voluntariness 
test rather than objective, Miranda-style compulsion as the 
underlying touchstone. 
In the voluntariness paradigm, the recitation and waiver of 
Miranda warnings creates a presumption that the resulting 
confession was voluntary. In order for courts administering this 
presumption to have confidence that the warning-and-waiver 
procedure actually leads to voluntary confessions in most in-
stances—thus making this presumption sound and meaning-
ful—a logical connection should exist between the concept of 
voluntariness and the content of the warnings themselves. In 
other words, a prophylactic warning system designed to ensure 
voluntariness should be designed in large part to remove from 
consideration the factors that might cause a suspect to speak 
involuntarily. If a court knows that the warnings have ren-
dered those considerations irrelevant, it can then feel confident 
that the resulting confession was made voluntarily. 
To be effective, therefore, the warnings should rid the sus-
pect’s mind of pressures that she fears might be lurking, but 
that will not come to pass because of her constitutional rights. 
At the outset of custodial interrogation, a suspect might have 
fears that, if not relieved, could substantially contribute to an 
involuntary confession during the course of an interrogation. 
Examples include: What will happen if I talk? What will hap-
pen if I refuse to talk? Will I be tortured? Must I answer ques-
tions because I will be presumed guilty if I refuse? If I start to 
talk, am I stuck talking, or can I change my mind later? If I 
talk, will the police be able to twist my words and claim I said 
something that I didn’t really say? If I don’t talk, will they 
question me for hours on end until I tell them what they want 
to hear? If the police do something bad to me like hit me or de-
 
 122. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483–86 (1966). 
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prive me of food to get me to talk, will they be able to get away 
with it because it will be my word against their word? 
The voluntariness test is so broad that no list of unin-
formed fears could be complete or tailored to fit the unique vul-
nerabilities of each suspect.123 Nevertheless, a prophylactic rule 
designed to promote voluntariness should be designed to allevi-
ate as many of these ill-founded fears as reasonably possible. 
Doing so would permit courts deciding the admissibility of a 
confession applying a voluntariness test to feel comfortable that 
the suspect spoke from her own free will and not as a result of 
these hypothetical fears having overborne her will in cases 
where warnings were administered and waived. With this goal 
in mind, this Article proposes the following warnings as illus-
trative of one potential set of warnings that would more accu-
rately trigger the presumption of voluntariness than the cur-
rent warnings: 
Introductory Remarks 
  You have a number of important constitutional rights that protect 
you when law enforcement officers ask questions of you. These rights 
ensure that police interviews are conducted in a civilized and humane 
manner and that if you talk, it is a choice made by you on your own 
free will. 
The Right to Remain Silent 
  First and foremost, you have a right to remain silent. This means, 
of course, that you do not have to talk to us. 
Implications of Remaining Silent 
  If you choose to remain silent at the beginning or at any time dur-
ing the interview, you will not be penalized in any way for doing so. 
You will not be physically harmed or punished, you will not be de-
prived of any benefits or privileges, and your silence will not be used 
against you in court to suggest that you have something to hide and 
must therefore be guilty. 
Implications of Talking 
  If you choose to talk, anything you say will be used against you in 
a court of law. If you choose to talk, you may change your mind and 
remain silent at any time. In other words, we will honor your request 
to remain silent at any time, and this interview will last no longer 
than you wish it to last. We also, as required by law, have already 
started videotaping our entire interview with you, and this tape will 
be admissible in a court of law by you or by law enforcement to prove 
what was said and what happened during this interview. 
From the outset, it is important to note the absence of right 
to counsel warnings in this hypothetical set of warnings. While 
 
 123. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 468–70 (describing the breadth of the 
voluntariness test). 
GODSEY_3FMT 04/20/2006 10:25:48 AM 
814 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:781 
 
the right to counsel warnings may have a civilized and “feel 
good” quality to them, they do not, as discussed above in Part 
I.C, play a significant role in practice.124 While including right 
to counsel warnings would not undermine the policies of the 
voluntariness test, the policies underlying these warnings could 
be better supported in other ways, as described below.125 
The first category of warnings above consists of introduc-
tory remarks summarizing the applicable rights in plain and 
clear language. Indeed, if ensuring voluntariness is the goal of 
the warnings, a suspect should be advised at the outset that 
the interrogation will be conducted in a civilized and humane 
manner, and that she need answer questions only if she decides 
to answer on her own free will. This statement would set the 
proper tone and inform the suspect that the police will act in a 
professional manner. Moreover, this introductory statement is 
helpful because it is not couched in terms of “rights” or legal 
jargon, as are the remaining warnings, but acts as an easily 
understandable summary of the more detailed warnings to fol-
low. This statement, therefore, acts in a straightforward way to 
relieve fears of improper coercion, setting the stage for a dis-
cussion in which the suspect will be able to speak on her own 
free will if and when she decides to talk. 
The next warning advises the suspect of her right to re-
main silent and is followed by two additional warnings that ex-
plain what it means to say that silence is a “right.” The third 
warning, therefore, provides a complete description of the con-
sequences, or lack thereof, of choosing to remain silent. Regard-
ing silence, this warning should fully disabuse the suspect of 
the notion that she will be penalized if she chooses to remain 
silent, thus removing this instinctual fear that research has 
shown is ever present in her mind. Rather than leaving the 
suspect guessing as to what a “right to remain silent” means, 
the warnings should adequately explain, in plain language, 
what it means to say that her choice to remain silent is a 
 
 124. I am by no means hostile to the inclusion of right to counsel warnings 
in Miranda’s prophylactic structure. However, if one applies the same scrutiny 
to the right to counsel warnings that one does when considering whether new 
warnings should be added, the weight of the arguments leans against their 
inclusion. As a compromise, I would agree to remove the right to counsel warn-
ings in exchange for adding the modifications to the warnings proposed in this 
Article. 
 125. For an argument that the right to counsel warnings could be sup-
ported under an equal protection theory, see supra note 93. See supra note 104 
for a discussion of another alternative. 
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“right.” She will not be tortured, she will not lose benefits or 
privileges, and her silence will not be used against her in court. 
In the same vein, the warnings proceed in the next section 
to fully advise the suspect of what will happen if, on the other 
hand, she chooses to speak. She must be informed at the outset 
that her statements can be used against her in a court of law, 
so that she understands the implications of her choice. The 
warnings must continue by informing her that if she chooses to 
speak, she can still invoke her right to silence at any time 
thereafter as the interview progresses. This statement, coupled 
with a requirement that the police repeat the warnings at peri-
odic intervals during lengthy interrogations, would help play 
the role that defense counsel would play if present. This proce-
dure would protect against her will becoming overborne as the 
interrogation progresses and as the initial warnings fade into 
the recesses of her mind. 
Finally, the police should be required to videotape the in-
terrogation and inform the suspect that if she speaks, the en-
tire interview will be recorded. A suspect who knows that the 
interrogation is being videotaped and that the videotape will be 
admissible in court, will have substantially less fear that the 
police will engage in third-degree tactics, and will know that 
her statement will be accurately recorded. Because the volun-
tariness test considers the totality of the circumstances, video-
taping provides the perfect prophylactic safeguard, as it cap-
tures the nuances and subtleties of interrogations that courts 
currently struggle to reconstruct at suppression hearings. 
The hypothetical set of warnings above illustrates that be-
cause of the voluntariness test’s breadth, a wide variety of 
warnings could be considered as part of a warnings require-
ment. The set of warnings constructed above is by no means in-
tended to represent the ultimate solution to the voluntariness 
quagmire. 
Whether or not the Court ever completely reconstructs the 
warnings in a manner similar to the hypothetical warnings 
suggested above, the specific modifications this Article suggests 
are helpful to a voluntariness analysis. For example, informing 
a suspect that her silence will not be used against her directly 
supports the goal of a voluntariness standard. Just as fear of a 
penalty for remaining silent could constitute compulsion, a 
suspect’s erroneous fear that she must speak or she will other-
wise be damned could be an important factor that, along with 
other pressures, could easily cause a suspect to speak involun-
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tarily. Informing a suspect that her silence will not be used in 
this manner, therefore, removes that factor from consideration. 
The presumption of voluntariness that is currently made with 
the recitation and waiver of Miranda warnings would be more 
complete and sound were this warning added to the litany. 
The remaining modifications, for the reasons stated, also 
do a better job of capturing the policies and concerns of the vol-
untariness test than do the current Miranda warnings. Courts 
employing this updated version of the warnings, including a 
videotaping requirement, could feel more confident that after 
these warnings have been provided to a suspect and waived, 
the presumption of voluntariness that attaches to the resulting 
confession is more clearly and logically justified than the same 
presumption that arises under the current rendition of the 
warnings. 
In sum, the current warnings were designed with an objec-
tive compulsion theory in mind, and the Miranda Court essen-
tially copied verbatim the warnings that the FBI had been us-
ing for two years prior to its decision. The Court at that time 
did not create the warnings with the all-encompassing, highly 
subjective voluntariness test in mind that it now employs. The 
modifications to the prophylactic warning procedure proposed 
in this Article would be better suited to trigger the voluntari-
ness presumption than the outdated warnings currently in use. 
C. THE IMPACT OF MODERN DEVELOPMENTS ON THE WARNINGS 
ANALYZED UNDER THE DUE PROCESS NOTICE THEORY 
Leading Miranda scholar George C. Thomas III has argued 
that the Miranda warnings are presently best justified under 
the Fourteenth Amendment “due process notice” cases.126 Tho-
mas argues that in many instances the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause requires the government to provide 
notice to citizens before it attempts to deprive them of a liberty 
interest.127 Thomas further argues that suspects have a liberty 
interest in not being subjected to custodial interrogation and a 
separate liberty interest in making an informed choice as to 
 
 126. See Thomas, supra note 93, at 1091, 1112–17. Examples of Fourteenth 
Amendment “due process notice” cases that Thomas refers to include Tulsa 
Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988), Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See 
Thomas, supra note 93, at 1109 n.127, 1113 nn.145–46, 1114 n.147. 
 127. Thomas, supra note 93, at 1091, 1113–14. 
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whether to answer police questions.128 Because the Self-
Incrimination Clause is not self-implementing, the due process 
notice cases require the government to (1) warn a suspect of 
rights relevant to custodial interrogation that are found within, 
or derived as prophylactic rules from, provisions in the Bill of 
Rights, and (2) provide her with sufficient information about 
those rights and rules so that she can invoke them and effec-
tively contest the deprivation of a liberty interest if she so de-
sires.129 
Although Thomas argues that the due process notice cases 
provide the best justification for the Miranda warnings, he has 
not yet deeply delved into the issue of whether the content of 
the warnings should change were the Court to openly adopt 
this theory.130 An adoption of the due process notice doctrine for 
Miranda, however, would certainly require a reformulation of 
the warnings tailored to fit that theory. Indeed, the current 
warnings are not up-to-date because they fail to adequately ap-
prise suspects of all the applicable rights and prophylactic rules 
of custodial interrogation, some of which were not recognized 
until after the warnings were originally crafted. Nor do the cur-
rent warnings provide suspects with sufficient information to 
make an “informed choice,” as the consequences of remaining 
silent, for example, have been clarified post-Miranda without 
updating the warnings to reflect such change. 
Viewed through this due process notice theory lens, it is 
clear that a suspect would need to be notified at the outset, as 
the Miranda warnings currently do, of her right to remain si-
lent under the Self-Incrimination Clause. In addition, however, 
in order to make an informed choice as to whether she should 
speak or remain silent, the warnings would need to adequately 
 
 128. Id. at 1112–14; see also Susan R. Klein, Miranda’s Exceptions in a 
Post-Dickerson World, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567, 570–72 (2001) 
(summarizing and challenging Thomas’s due process notice theory). Thomas 
also identifies a third liberty interest relevant to custodial interrogation: the 
right not to reveal secrets to the police. Thomas, supra note 93, at 1114–15. 
 129. See Thomas, supra note 93, at 1113–14 (discussing the fact that the 
due process notice cases require not only notice of rights, but also require the 
state to convey sufficient information about those rights for citizens to make 
an informed choice as to whether to challenge a deprivation of a liberty inter-
est). For a thoughtful critique of Thomas’s due process notice theory, see 
Klein, supra note 128, at 568–96. 
 130. See Thomas, supra note 93, at 1113–14 (recognizing that the content 
of the warnings might differ under a due process notice theory, but arguing, 
without significant discussion, that at a minimum the current warnings can be 
justified on that theory). 
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advise her of the consequences of both choices, an objective that 
the Miranda warnings currently do not achieve. Thus, warn-
ings created under this theory might provide: 
You have a right to remain silent. If you choose to talk, anything you 
say can and will be used against you in a court of law. If you choose to 
talk, you may change your mind and remain silent at any time. If you 
choose to remain silent, on the other hand, you will not be penalized 
in any way. You will not be physically harmed or punished; you will 
not be deprived of any benefits or privileges; and your silence will not 
be used against you as evidence to suggest that you committed a 
crime simply because you refused to speak. 
Each of the “rights” above have been included in the hypo-
thetical warnings because they are actual rights derived from 
the Court’s interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause, and 
thus would fall within the notification requirements of the due 
process notice cases. The first sentence, “You have a right to 
remain silent,” is a notification of the core right in the Self-
Incrimination Clause.131 The second sentence educates the sus-
pect of the consequences of speaking so that she can make an 
informed choice—also a requirement of Thomas’s due process 
notice theory. The third sentence informs the suspect that 
speaking does not waive the right to remain silent, and can be 
invoked at any time. This warning also reflects a core rule that 
the Court has derived from the Self-Incrimination Clause.132 
The remaining language informs the suspect of the conse-
quences (or lack thereof) of remaining silent. As described in 
detail above,133 clear recognition that a suspect would suffer no 
penalty for remaining silent did not come until several years 
after Miranda was decided, and was not at that time added to 
the litany because the Court erroneously believed that it was 
“implicit” in the warnings.134 Because this right clearly exists 
now and empirical findings suggest that it is not, from the per-
spective of most suspects, “implicit” in the warnings, it would 
be required under a due process notice theory so that the sus-
pect could make an informed choice as to whether to challenge 
the deprivation of a liberty interest by invoking her right to 
remain silent. 
The right to counsel warnings would not be included in the 
litany under a due process notice theory for several reasons. 
 
 131. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966). 
 132. See id. 
 133. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976). 
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First, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel no longer applies 
during most interrogations.135 Thus, no notice is required in 
connection with that specific provision. Second, no actual Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel exists during custodial interroga-
tion even under a Miranda compulsion theory because invoca-
tion of the right to counsel works to terminate the interrogation 
rather than to supply the suspect with counsel.136 Third, while 
the Court has retained the right to counsel warnings to date 
because it has not attempted to revamp the warnings in light of 
modern developments, the Court has undermined the “compul-
sion” theory that originally justified these warnings.137 In addi-
tion, were the Court to reconsider the issue anew, the warnings 
would not be required under the current voluntariness stan-
dard that now underlies the warnings.138 Finally, if the Court 
openly endorsed a due process notice theory to Miranda, the 
“compulsion” theory that originally justified the right to counsel 
during interrogations would be a dead letter, and such right to 
counsel would not be one of the existing rights for which notice 
is required.139 Thus, because the Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel is illusory in practice, no longer finds clear validity in 
constitutional doctrine, and would be completely uprooted if the 
Court adopted a due process notice approach to Miranda while 
abandoning the compulsion theory that originally justified the 
right to counsel warnings, no warning relating to the right to 
counsel would be required.140 
Thus far, all of the modifications suggested in this Article 
except two—the requirement to repeat the warnings at periodic 
intervals throughout lengthy interrogations and the require-
ment to videotape interrogations—would be implemented un-
der a due process notice theory. At the present time, however, 
neither of these two remaining rules has been found by the 
 
 135. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra notes 30–40 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text. 
 139. If the Court fully abandoned the compulsion and voluntariness theo-
ries and instead adopted a pure due process notice theory, the original “com-
pulsion dispelling” justification for the warnings described in Miranda would 
no longer be applicable. See Klein, supra note 128, at 571–72 (arguing that 
Thomas’s theory requires an abandonment of the compulsion and voluntari-
ness rationales of Miranda). 
 140. But see Thomas, supra note 93, at 1113 (stating, without discussion, 
that the right to counsel warnings would be included under a due process no-
tice theory). 
GODSEY_3FMT 04/20/2006 10:25:48 AM 
820 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:781 
 
Court to derive from any provision in the Bill of Rights applica-
ble to interrogations. Accordingly, they would not be part of a 
notice-based warning system. In the future, however, the Court 
could require these procedures under the Self-Incrimination 
Clause or notions of substantive due process.141 If the Court 
were to rethink the prophylactic rules necessary to more effec-
tively implement the voluntariness test, for example, these re-
quirements would be logical additions to the mix for the rea-
sons discussed in Part II.B. 
In sum, nearly all of the modifications suggested in this 
Article find support under Thomas’s due process notice theory 
of Miranda. Regardless of whether the Court justifies the warn-
ings on a theory of compulsion, voluntariness, or due process 
notice, a substantial modification of the warnings is presently 
called for to bring them in line with contemporary law and un-
derstanding. 
D. THE IMPACT OF MODERN DEVELOPMENTS ANALYZED UNDER 
THE OBJECTIVE PENALTIES THEORY 
In a pair of recent articles, I set forth yet another modern 
justification for the Self-Incrimination Clause and Miranda 
warnings.142 An analysis of the historical origins, text, and poli-
cies of the Self-Incrimination Clause suggests that it should be 
interpreted to ban police imposition of “objective penalties” on 
suspects to provoke speech or punish silence.143 A complete de-
scription of the objective penalties test has been provided in 
prior articles and thus need not be rehashed in full here.144 In 
short, an objective penalty is defined as any act or threat by the 
officer that changes a suspect’s preinterrogation baseline or 
status quo to her detriment, if done by the officer to punish si-
lence or provoke speech.145 For example, depriving a suspect of 
food or water, taking away her cigarettes, or even threatening 
to remove her child from her custody could constitute an objec-
 
 141. Professor Leo has argued, for example, that videotaped interrogation 
should be made a requirement of substantive due process. See Leo, supra note 
2, at 681–92. In addition, Professor Christopher Slobogin has argued that a 
videotaping requirement could be mandated under the Due Process Clause, 
the Self-Incrimination Clause, or the Confrontation Clause. See Christopher 
Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309, 309–22 (2003). 
 142. See Godsey, supra note 6, at 1735–52; Godsey, supra note 20 passim. 
 143. See Godsey, supra note 20 passim. 
 144. See Godsey, supra note 6, at 1735–52; Godsey, supra note 20 passim. 
 145. Godsey, supra note 20, at 515–40. 
GODSEY_3FMT 04/20/2006 10:25:48 AM 
2006] REFORMULATING MIRANDA WARNINGS 821 
 
tive penalty if the circumstances indicate that it was done by 
the officer to provoke speech or punish silence.146 This standard 
is derived in large part through application of the “formal set-
ting” cases,147 which establish that any penalty imposed on a 
suspect to provoke speech or punish silence violates the Self-
Incrimination Clause, as it is inconsistent with a true right to 
remain silent.148 
While the Court has at various times supported an objec-
tive penalties test for the Self-Incrimination Clause, its appli-
cation has not been adopted in the interrogation context.149 If 
this standard were adopted, however, Miranda-style warnings 
would play an important role in administering the test.150 Al-
though I have delineated the objective penalties test and de-
scribed the general purpose of the warnings in prior articles, I 
have not yet addressed whether the content of the warnings 
would be modified were the Court to adopt this theory of consti-
tutional confession law.151 This Article presents the perfect op-
portunity to do so. 
Simply stated, an objective penalties test would require a 
set of warnings that would enable a suspect to maintain her 
status quo with the police and thereby ensure that the interro-
gation itself does not become a penalty. Specifically, warnings 
would be employed as a prophylactic measure to ensure that 
the act of interrogation itself does not constitute an objective 
penalty.152 The most obvious and frequent way in which the act 
of interrogation itself would constitute a penalty is when an in-
terrogator continues to press the suspect for a particular an-
swer that the suspect is unwilling to provide.153 When this oc-
curs, the officer’s persistent questioning might cause the 
suspect to believe that she must answer the officer’s questions 
 
 146. See id. 
 147. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Gardner v. Broder-
ick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
 148. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 492–95, 515–40. 
 149. Id. at 492–95, 516–17 (discussing a single case, Garrity, 385 U.S. 493, 
496–500 (1967), in which the Court seemed to apply the objective penalties 
test in the interrogation context). 
 150. Id. at 528–30. 
 151. Id. at 530 n.320 (leaving open for a future article the question of what 
form the warnings would take under the objective penalties test). 
 152. Id. at 529–30. 
 153. Id. at 528. 
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in the desired manner or face uninterrupted harassment.154 
This restraint on freedom would be a penalty imposed by the 
officer in response to the suspect’s exercise of her constitutional 
right to remain silent.155 
To avoid this scenario, therefore, the warnings must make 
clear to the suspect at the outset that she has a right to remain 
silent, and that she can cut off questioning at any time and end 
the interview. This warning protects against the suspect choos-
ing to talk simply to avoid the penalty of liberty-restraining 
pressure from the officer.156 
In addition, because a reasonable suspect might fear that if 
she remains silent she will be penalized, the warnings must 
disabuse her of that notion. Absent the officer conveying this 
specific information, the suspect may talk for fear of a future 
penalty, such as physical abuse or the prosecution using her si-
lence to infer guilt at trial. At the outset, therefore, the warn-
ings would need to provide: 
You have a right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be 
used against you in a court of law. If you choose to talk, you may 
change your mind and stop talking at any time. If you choose to re-
main silent at the beginning or at any time during the interview, you 
will not be penalized or deprived of your rights in any way as a result 
of that choice. You will not be physically harmed or punished, you will 
not be deprived of any benefits or privileges, and your silence will not 
be used against you as evidence to suggest that you committed a 
crime simply because you refused to speak. 
The remaining modifications to the warnings suggested in 
this Article would also be imperative for effective implementa-
tion of the objective penalties test. For example, creating a pro-
phylactic rule that police officers must re-advise the suspect at 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 528–30. Under an objective penalties test: 
Miranda warnings might not be required per se, but their application 
would be at the officer’s discretion when he or she perceived the act of 
interrogation might begin to resemble a penalty. Because the officer 
who refrained from providing Miranda warnings in such a case would 
assume the risk that a court will later find that a penalty was 
imposed, the practice would certainly develop that officers would rou-
tinely provide Miranda warnings at the outset of almost any interro-
gation to be on the safe side. However, this flexible rule would free of-
ficers from having to provide the warnings in certain circumstances 
where it is not practicable or where they intend to ask only a few 
questions without pressuring the suspect or changing the suspect’s 
baseline in any way. 
Id. at 529 n.317. 
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periodic intervals throughout lengthy interrogations would en-
sure that the suspect has a “continuous opportunity to exercise” 
her right to remain silent. If she starts to feel intimidated or 
unsure of her ability to control her destiny in the interrogation 
room as the interview progresses, a reaffirmation of her unfet-
tered ability to reinstate her preinterrogation status quo by in-
voking her right to silence would ensure that the act of interro-
gation itself does not begin to resemble a penalty. As a 
prophylactic rule, this requirement would directly support and 
reinforce the Self-Incrimination Clause’s ban on “objective pen-
alties.”157 
A prophylactic videotaping requirement would also be ap-
propriate for an objective penalties test. Under the voluntari-
ness test, as currently implemented, courts assume that a con-
fession was made voluntarily if the Miranda warnings were 
provided and waived. As a result, courts provide very little 
oversight as to what goes on during interrogations after the 
Miranda waiver has been obtained.158 The objective penalties 
test, however, requires courts to scrutinize an interrogator’s 
 
 157. Although it has been included in the above recitation of warnings, it is 
difficult to justify the warning, “Anything you say can and will be used against 
you in a court of law,” under the objective penalties test. Perhaps the best ar-
gument for including this warning in the litany is that if a suspect is not ad-
vised of the consequences of speaking, she might choose to speak out of igno-
rance and thus provide evidence of guilt to the prosecution and, in the process, 
change her status quo to her detriment. Thus, the act of interrogation might 
constitute a penalty without this warning, as it would place her in a situation 
where severe consequences might follow, and where she is not armed with suf-
ficient information to make a decision as to how to maintain her status quo 
vis-à-vis the state. 
 158. See Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, 
Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 497 n.9 
(2002) (citing a number of scholars in support of the proposition that “[i]t is 
now widely recognized that when the police follow Miranda’s procedural in-
structions by administering the warnings and obtaining a waiver, Miranda 
serves as a license, rather than an impediment, to secure usable confessions.”); 
Godsey, supra note 20, at 513; Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the At-
torney General, and the Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 733, 752–54 (1987) (providing five examples of cases where courts have 
admitted involuntary confessions into evidence in marginal cases); William J. 
Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 988 (2001) (noting that 
courts may tolerate more coercion because the burden is on defendants who 
have waived their rights to show they did not understand the warnings); 
Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Prac-
tices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1220 (2001) (“A finding that the police have prop-
erly informed the suspect of his Miranda rights . . . often has the effect of 
minimizing or eliminating scrutiny applied to post-waiver interrogation prac-
tices.”). 
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conduct throughout the entirety of an interrogation to deter-
mine whether a penalty was imposed at any time.159 In some 
instances, this scrutiny requires knowledge of the precise 
statements made by the interrogator to the suspect to deter-
mine whether the interrogator threatened the suspect with a 
negative penalty, or, on the other hand, merely offered her a 
benefit in exchange for a confession.160 Therefore, a videotaping 
requirement would be an essential prophylactic rule to effec-
tively administer the Self-Incrimination Clause’s objective pen-
alties test. Instead of litigating a “swearing contest” between 
the police officer and the suspect concerning what happened in 
the interrogation room,161 the court would have a clean record 
in the form of a video recording to efficiently resolve the factual 
disputes that naturally arise under this test. 
Similar to the other theories explored in this Article, the 
right to counsel warnings would not be required in the objective 
penalties rubric. The objective penalties test does not attempt 
to measure the subjective state of mind of individual suspects 
under interrogation,162 so the hypothetical coercion-lessening 
effects of the right to counsel warnings would not be relevant. 
While a suspect might assume that the interrogator will pro-
hibit her from bringing her attorney into the interrogation 
room, this assumption does not constitute a penalty imposed by 
the interrogator to provoke speech or punish silence if the in-
terrogator has done nothing to instill this fear. Indeed, if the 
interrogator has provided the suspect with the hypothetical 
warnings provided above and complies with the procedure set 
forth herein, then the suspect has been fully equipped with the 
ability to maintain her status quo. If she does not wish to speak 
for any reason—from a desire to have her attorney present to a 
desire to finish her dinner prior to talking—then she may cut 
off questioning without penalty.163 The warnings designed 
herein are sufficiently broad to ensure that the suspect is fully 
aware that she is in the driver’s seat and controls her own des-
 
 159. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 528–30. 
 160. Id. at 531. 
 161. See Drizin & Reich, supra note 106, at 624–25 (describing the “swear-
ing contest” that takes place in court when interrogations are not recorded). 
 162. See Godsey, supra note 20, at 515–40. 
 163. If a suspect requests the presence of an attorney during the interroga-
tion, then the strict rules of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981), 
limiting the interrogator’s authority to reinitiate the questioning, would apply 
in this context. 
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tiny with respect to the interrogation and the conditions under 
which she may agree to talk to the police. 
CONCLUSION 
Since Miranda was decided in 1966, courts and scholars 
have devoted very little substantive attention to the content of 
the warnings. In this time, however, much has changed. Em-
pirical research and four decades of practical experience have 
demonstrated that the warnings do not fully achieve their in-
tended policy objectives. The legal rights embodied in the warn-
ings have been altered, with new rights being recognized and 
others falling into the background. In addition, the theoretical 
underpinnings of the Miranda decision have evolved as much 
as has the technological ability to regulate confession law 
through modern devices such as video cameras. During this 
time, the content of the warnings has remained static, failing to 
keep pace with the dramatic changes in its environs. 
In this Article, I have attempted to open the debate about 
whether and how the Miranda warnings should be updated. I 
have proposed some specific modifications and set forth a for-
mat for evaluating potential modifications. This format first 
examines specific post-Miranda changes and developments in 
law and practical knowledge, and then asks whether modifica-
tions to the warnings to reflect such new developments make 
sense in light of the various justifications and theories of 
Miranda put forth by scholars and courts. 
With Miranda’s fortieth anniversary upon us, the time is 
ripe to debate this issue in depth to determine whether and to 
what extent the warnings need to be reformulated to once 
again make them consistent with the legal theories that justify 
their existence, and to make them more effective in enforcing 
and protecting the constitutional rights they were designed to 
serve. 
 
